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EUROPEAN EXTERNAL ACTION SERVICE



ISP.3 – Integrated Strategic Planning for CSDP and Stabilisation

**Working document of the European External Action Service**

**of 15/11/2021**

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### **Political and Strategic Environment of CSDP Missions in the Central African Republic (CAR)**

#### **REFERENCES**

- A. EU-Wide strategic framework to support Security Sector Reform, JOIN(2016) 31 final.
- B. Considerations for a possible Civilian CSDP Mission in the Central African Republic (CAR) dated 27 April 2018 (ST 8472/18).
- C. EEAS Concept Note – CSDP action in CAR for the Internal Security Forces. Adding an "Interoperability pillar" to EUTM RCA dated 7 September 2018 (ST 11677/18).
- D. Political Framework for Crisis Approach in the Central African Republic dated 8 October 2018 (WK 11843/2018).
- E. Joint PMG Recommendations and CIVCOM Advice on the EEAS Concept Note - CSDP action in CAR for the Internal Security Forces - Adding an "Interoperability pillar" to EUTM RCA dated 25 October 2018 (ST 13555/18).
- F. Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/1941 amending Decision (CFSP) 2016/610 on a European Union military training mission in the Central African Republic dated 10 December 2018.
- G. EEAS Information Note – Dedicated Evaluation Report on the Interoperability Pillar of EUTM RCA and way forward dated 23 August 2019(ST 11713/2019).
- H. Crisis Management Concept EUAM RCA dated 18 October 2019 (ST13300/2019).
- I. CivCom Advice on the Crisis Management Concept (CMC) for a civilian CSDP Advisory Mission in the Central African Republic (EUAM RCA) dated 15 November 2019 (ST 14091/2019).
- J. Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/2110 of 9 December 2019 on the European Union CSDP Advisory Mission in the Central African Republic (EUAM RCA).
- K. Strategic Review of the EU Military Training Mission in the Central African Republic (EUTM RCA) 2020 dated 10 March 2020 (ST6720/2020).
- L. Operational Plan (OPLAN) for the CSDP Mission EUAM RCA dated 1 July 2020 (ST

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8167/2020 (R-UE/EU-R)).

- M. Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/1131 of 30 July 2020 launching the European Union CSDP Advisory Mission in the Central African Republic (EUAM RCA).
- N. Suggestions for crisis management procedures for CSDP crisis management operations of 18 June 2013 (ST 7660/2013).

### **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

1. Since last year, the political and security context in CAR remains difficult. In December 2020, a newly established alliance led by ex-president Francois Bozize, the CPC (*Coalition des Patriotes pour le Changement*) launched a series of simultaneous attacks with the objective to march on Bangui in order to force the Government to stop the electoral process and open a “*concertation nationale*” under their terms.
2. On the eve of the vote held on 27 December, the CAR Government asked and obtained bilateral military support from Rwanda (RW) and Russia (RU). Yet while RW sent active military personnel, RU support was almost exclusively through mercenaries of RU private military company Wagner (WG). CAR’s neighbours and International Organisations addressed by President Touadera, could not provide the requested capabilities. Action by RU/WG personnel leading FACA into combat, allowed the CAR Government to force the CPC to withdraw into its strongholds, but also paved the way for more intrusive and unilateral actions of RU/WG in CAR. Meanwhile, MINUSCA’s perceived inability to provide credible support to the CAR Government has damaged its reputation. Poor planning and management, absence of coordination, desertions/defections of deployed FACA (*Forces Armées Centrafricaines*) and Internal Security Forces (ISF) around Election Day worsened the situation.
3. At the moment, the security situation in CAR remains unstable and dynamic, with the CPC acting in a guerrilla style mode of operation in the countryside, while the main provinces of CAR and its cities are under the control of the Government, supported by their bilateral RU partner. The CPC still poses a constant threat to CAR internal security, as its structures are mostly intact.

4. Since June 2021, Rwanda ceased all bilateral support and refrains from joint operations with FACA and RU/WG.
5. Today, most deployed FACA units are operating under direct command or supervision by WG mercenaries. WG has also established a solid influence on the FACA General Staff and other government institutions, as well as support through proxies in the National Assembly. Command and control relations between deployed units and the FACA General Staff are extremely weak. This is regularly exploited by RU/WG mercenaries, who are able unhindered to take over command on the spot and thus use FACA for their own operations, with CAR participation and the agreement or passive acquiescence of CAR authorities.
6. Besides conducting operations against the CPC, WG/RU are also training the FACA in a non-transparent manner. While continuously stressing the superior quality of RU support, they have provided additional training to units already certified by EUTM RCA. The newly EUTM trained formed *Bataillon d'Infanterie Territoriale 7* (BIT 7), in addition to the creation of BIT 8/BIT 9, admitted by the Chief of Staff of FACA, is the last but critical example of their ability to act according to their needs and in impunity.
7. On 15 October 2021, President Touadera declared a unilateral ceasefire for the entire territory of CAR for national security forces and their bilateral support. Accepted after intense lobbying by the International Conference of the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), the ceasefire is part of the roadmap established during the 16 September 2021 summit in Luanda. This includes the cessation of offensive operations against Armed Groups (AG) that accepted the Luanda-roadmap. FACA and ISF will however, continue to maintain public security and order and act against non-compliant AG.
8. The ceasefire, although already violated by the conflict parties several times, represents a new dynamic in the political and security dimension and - provided it is not systematically breached and is properly monitored - might force the CAR Government to shift from a state of war towards a normalisation process, including with the international community. An increased and coordinated engagement of regional actors, like the International Conference of the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), and other international players could generate a political

solution to the conflict in CAR. This could, if it were accompanied by concrete measures, enable the CAR government to reduce its current reliance on RU support.

9. If the RU/WG influence and actions were to decrease and full transparency between the CAR government and the international community were re-established, besides assistance at the strategic level, practical measures for immediate support and relief to the CAR security forces would be necessary. Since EUTM and EUAM are limited to non-executive mandates, they are designed only to support long-term reestablishment, reform processes and structural objectives in a permissive environment, in addition to training.
10. The intended reestablishment of FACA/ISF and the support provided to the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and Ministry of the Interior and Public Security (MoI PS) needs a condition-based foundation. Only when the necessary commitment by CAR authorities to full transparency, international training standards and respect for Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law have been politically approved and the respective decisions implemented, CSDP actors should be able to fully engage in the foreseen support to CAR security forces and to generate the desired effects. This includes the commitment of the new CAR Government to the agreed framework, established when each CSDP mission was launched, including on Human Rights (HR), International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and Rule of Law (RoL) aspects.
11. The establishment of a strong RU/WG presence in CAR, with increased influence on decision makers in Bangui, has placed international actors like MINUSCA, but also the EU CSDP Missions, in a more complex environment. It will now be necessary to support the CAR government in finding options to weaken this influence, propose viable alternatives and to monitor if this will lead into concrete actions. The future positioning of the CAR government related to WG/FACA operations, including their HR and IHL violations; the implementation of the commonly defined objectives of the National Defence Plan (NDP); and RU influence on the ISF will need to be closely monitored and assessed, as the predation of the economic sector. This analysis will determine the future EU CSDP footprint in CAR, which will be recommended in the upcoming holistic Strategic Review of EUTM and EUAM RCA.

12. The following orientations for further analysis and monitoring until the conduct of the Holistic Strategic Review of EUTM/EUAM RCA during the first semester of 2022 are envisaged:

***In the political domain:***

- The CAR government is internally fragmented and does not represent an aligned political force. It will therefore be necessary to monitor and further analyse the approach and actual steps that CAR political actors will undertake, with a specific focus on their links with RU/WG.
- The expressed commitment to common objectives between the CAR government and the EU should result in concrete positive actions, such as a cessation of military action by WG/FACA in compliance with the ceasefire and the Luanda roadmap. Progress on the next steps of this roadmap should be monitored and supported/accompanied, if possible.
- The question of the dependency of the CAR authorities on RU/WG needs to be answered as RU/WG have increased their influence in many national decision making processes, thereby obstructing the efforts of the EU.

***In the inter-institutional domain:***

- The reinforcement of MINUSCA and its ability to fulfil its mandate will be a decisive factor, as well as the full respect of the SOFA of MINUSCA by all actors. The future actions of MINUSCA in presence of new actors in CAR needs to be observed.
- A revitalized engagement by the region/neighbouring countries and its regional organisations could increase their influence on CAR decision makers, especially if a credible regional military security force would materialise and be deployed. These are potentially major determinants for future EU CSDP engagement, as well as for possible EU support to such a regional military force.

***In the SSR domain:***

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- The commitment of the CAR authorities, including the MoD, General Staff and the MoI to the agreed framework when each of the CSDP Missions was launched needs to be confirmed by action on the ground, and not only by statements.
- The CAR authorities' willingness to firmly develop Defence and Security Sector reforms supported by CSDP should be confirmed, including at senior operational level, as well as their commitment to CAR's National Defence Plan to establish a garrison army that would enable the presence of the State in the entire territory of CAR.
- The respect for international standards with regard to Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law by FACA/ISF during their operations needs to be further monitored and assessed, as well as the judicial follow up of violations already reported to the CAR government by MINUSCA.
- The fact that RU/WG takes over command and control on deployed FACA/ISF has to be monitored. This includes RU presence in the ISF training establishments and associated infrastructure.
- The engagement of RU actors in CAR executive coordination committees, like the *Comité de Coordination technique* (CCT), as an attempt to institutionalize RU engagement in CAR, should be addressed.
- Given the current circumstances, any future provision of EUTM training to FACA will be condition-based, with the definition of necessary caveats for its conduct, including the respect of HR and IHL.
- Options for bringing FACA back to a coordinated reestablishment process that includes recurrent operational training to BIT and the implementation of an operational cycle should be readdressed.
- The possibility of a strategic communication campaign by the EU, directed against WG influence and actions, not restricted to CAR, as well as HR violations FACA internally and against the CAR population, should be considered.



**I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND**

13. During CivCom discussions on the Crisis Management Concept (CMC) for the civilian EU CSDP Advisory Mission in CAR (EUAM RCA), Member States (MS) decided that the initial duration of the mandate of EUAM RCA should be two years from the date of the Council Decision launching the Mission. An Interim Strategic Review should have been provided to MS after the presidential and legislative elections in CAR in spring 2021.
14. However, due to the ongoing state of crisis in CAR, aggravated by the attacks of the “*Coalition des Patriotes pour le Changement*” (CPC) rebel coalition, the COVID-19 pandemic and logistic/human resources challenges of EUAM RCA in its establishment phase, the Mission only reached Full Operational Capability on 08 July 2021. As the preconditions to conduct the Interim Strategic Review were not met, MS agreed in PSC on 16 September 2021 that a political-strategic assessment of the environment for EU CSDP Missions in CAR should be provided instead.
15. This document therefore provides an analysis on the political and strategic environment of the CSDP Missions in CAR and their relevance and impact in a very dynamic environment. It outlines vectors for further analysis and development of the CSDP engagement in CAR, which will feed the Holistic Strategic Review of EUTM and EUAM RCA, to be presented by spring 2022, while the current Missions' mandates expire in September 2022 and August 2022, respectively.
16. This analysis has been coordinated within the EEAS and with relevant Commission services, and takes into account feedback by CAR authorities, international partner organizations and EU Member States. A fact finding Mission took place in CAR end of October 2021.

**II. SITUATION – GENERAL CONTEXT**

17. CAR is affected by political uncertainty, poor governance and a fragile public institutions, with insecurity and widespread poverty at its core. The internal conflict impacts badly on infrastructure, the investment climate and business security, notably in agricultural production, leaving plenty of room for an illegal economy to take hold. The National Recovery and Peacebuilding Plan (*Plan National de Relèvement et de Consolidation de la*

*Paix 2017-2021* (RCPCA)) constitutes the basis for revitalizing the national economy and coordinating donors, so far with mixed results, despite significant support. External international financial support remains indispensable.

18. The security situation in CAR since the end of 2020 has remained difficult. After ex-president Francois Bozize proclaimed that he would run as candidate for the presidential elections of 27 December 2020, it became clear that the security situation around the electoral period would be extremely volatile and challenging. The joint MINUSCA – *Forces Armées Centrafricaines* (FACA) / Internal Security Forces (ISF) security plan for the elections could not be implemented as envisaged, also owing to the insubstantial and late deployment of CAR security forces and a general lack of resources. Desertions/defections of deployed FACA/ISF around Election Day worsened the situation. On the eve of the vote, threatened by the CPC, the CAR Government asked and obtained bilateral military support from Rwanda (RW) and mostly Russia (RU).
19. The CAR Government established a nation-wide curfew in January 2021 until August 2021. Security has been reinforced in the capital to prevent incidents, with a joint FACA/ISF/ MINUSCA Defence Plan now in place.

***a) Political and security situation in CAR***

20. The peace process in CAR gained momentum through the signing of an inclusive Peace Agreement on 6 February 2019 (*Accord Politique pour la Paix et la Réconciliation* (APPR)) between the Government and 14 Armed Groups (AG). The implementation of the Peace Agreement has been facing challenges and resistance. An important element of the Peace Agreement, the set-up of Special Mixed Security Units (SMSU), financially supported by the EU, is encountering significant delays.
21. On 18 December 2020, a newly established alliance, the CPC (*Coalition des Patriotes pour le Changement*) launched a series of simultaneous attacks with a view to force the Government to stop the electoral process and open a “*concertation nationale*”. Despite the *Plan Intégré de Sécurisation des Elections* (PISE) and reinforcements of Rwanda and Russia, around 50% of

polling stations could not open and other only partially. Overall, the estimate is that only 37% of the registered voters were actually able to vote.

22. On 4 January 2021, the National Election Authority (*Autorité nationale des élections* (ANE)) announced the provisional results, declaring Touadera re-elected as President in the first round of elections with 53% of votes. This result was confirmed by the Constitutional Court on 18 January 2021. Consequently, President Touadera was inaugurated for his second term on 30 March 2021. The International Community recognized the difficult conditions for the conduct of the elections, and the results were acknowledged by the international community.
23. On 03 May 2021, the new Parliament (*Assemblée Nationale*) held its first meeting and on 12 June 2021, Henry Marie Dondra was nominated as the new Prime Minister of CAR and tasked to form a new inclusive government. He replaced Firmin Ngrebada, a strong supporter of the intensified RU engagement in CAR, including the deployment of RU Wagner mercenaries.
24. The current security situation in CAR remains unstable and dynamic, with the CPC having conducted attacks on cities and villages with the initial objective to take over Bangui and oust President Touadera. However, operations by MINUSCA and FACA with RU/RW support had visible effects and the CPC could be expelled from the majority of towns and villages that it held.
25. The preparations for an inclusive “Republican Dialogue”, announced by President Touadera during his inauguration speech, started in April 2021. The EU, like the other partners, was consulted and insisted on messages relating to rule of law, justice, corruption or the regional dimension, among others. At the end of the dialogue, a “Republican act of commitment” and road map for the next government should be adopted. Recently, defections of a number of political parties from the dialogue - linked to the proposed lifting of immunity of several leading opposition figures - have put the dialogue under threat. It remains to be seen whether this issue can be definitively resolved, although the President of the National Assembly has now announced he will withdraw the proposal, for the time being at least.

26. On 15 October 2021, President Touadera declared a unilateral ceasefire on the entire territory of CAR for national security forces and their bilateral support. This includes the cessation of offensive operations against AG that accepted the Luanda roadmap; FACA and ISF will continue to maintain public security and order. Accepted after intense lobbying by the ICGLR, the ceasefire is part of the roadmap established during the 16 September 2021 summit in Luanda. Four AG, members of the CPC also accepted this ceasefire. Offensive actions by the AG UPC, 3R and FPRC, however, are continuing and arising with the end of the wet season.

***b) Humanitarian Situation***

27. The humanitarian situation in the CAR constitutes an acute protection crisis, with numerous criminal incidents and violence against the civilian population. Thousands of cases of gender-based violence are reported by all parties. Humanitarian actors are not spared, with numerous attacks against them. CAR is considered one of the most dangerous environments for humanitarian workers. The lack of transport infrastructure also hampers humanitarian access.
28. The chronic instability has led to significant population movements, with more than 715,000 Central Africans refugees in neighbouring countries, and more than 722,000 people being internally displaced. The renewed violence has triggered new displacements again during 2021, amounting to over 280.000 displaced people since December 2020.
29. In 2021, 57% of the population (2.8 million out of 4.9 million) are in need of humanitarian assistance. Given the current violence, displaced people urgently need protection assistance. Many cases of sexual violence against women and girls, and child protection issues (unaccompanied and separated children, forced recruitment) are being reported. Access to education is an acute problem, with 50% of the children in CAR being unable to attend school.
30. Effective humanitarian civil-military coordination remains a challenge for CAR. The need for preserving the humanitarian space remains fundamental. The absence of distinctive uniforms

for FACA poses significant challenge to the humanitarian community in terms of identification.

31. Since 2014, the EU and its Member States have been one of the largest donors of humanitarian assistance in the CAR having provided more than €1.4 billion in aid funding (OECD), more than €216 million from the EU itself. In 2021, the EU is allocating €21.5 million in humanitarian aid, including €2 million to respond to the increased needs caused by the recent crisis related to the elections. EU humanitarian aid primarily focuses on covering the needs of the most vulnerable – uprooted people in the CAR and host communities – by providing them with: food assistance, emergency shelter, access to healthcare, water and sanitation, short-term livelihood and agricultural support, education in emergencies.

***c) Armed Groups in CAR***

32. The signature of the Peace Agreement was followed by a period of absence of major clashes, although confrontations between AG and AG-internally (e.g. UPC) persisted with numerous violations of the Peace Agreement and casualties among the civil population. The threat posed by AG came to a new level when, under the orchestration of Francois Bozize, the CPC was formed (mainly consisting of the AG UPC (*Union pour la Paix en Centrafrique*), MPC (*Mouvement Patriotique pour la Centrafrique*), 3R (*Retour, Réclamation et Réhabilitation*), FPRC (*Front Populaire pour la Renaissance de la Centrafrique*) and aBLK (anti-balaka)). This coalition took coordinated direct action against government institutions and security forces from end of December 2020 on. The CPC objectives are unchanged: take control over Bangui and remove President Touadera and his government.
33. At this stage, the CPC is no longer able to control major cities, but regularly stages attacks on RU/FACA forces that include the use of landmines. The limited presence and capabilities of FACA and MINUSCA directly affect the security situation. The operational and emergency deployments of FACA outside Bangui, with WG support and under WG command and control, continue, without coordination with MINUSCA. The CPC has shifted to a guerrilla style mode of operation and still poses a constant threat to CAR internal security, as its structures are mostly intact. However, internally, the CPC is becoming more fragmented. For example, the Armed Groups UPC (*Union pour la Paix en Centrafrique*) and FPRC (*Front*

*Populaire pour la Renaissance en Centrafrique*) did not accept the roadmap established through the Luanda-process, while the other AG and members of the CPC did.

34. The AG that have not joined the CPC and stayed within the arrangements of the PA, have provided ministers to the new government and are expected to take part in the upcoming “Republican Dialogue”. The participation of ex-AG members in the SMSU is progressing under questionable conditions. The first (partly) established SMSU in Bouar has been confronted with cases of desertion and strikes and the SMSU, after revitalization, will still have to show their operational effectiveness, if becoming operational at all.

***d) Security Sector Reform (SSR) progress***

35. The UN – via MINUSCA – is in the lead for the overall broader Security Sector Reform process in support of the CAR authorities. MINUSCA co-chairs the Strategic Committee on DDR and SSR and the Technical Committee of SSR in CAR. In the area of DSR, MINUSCA closely cooperates and coordinates with EUTM RCA as well as with the main actors providing support to the ISF like the UN Development Programme (UNDP), France (FR) and the United States (US). It is supporting the restructuring and reestablishment of CAR security forces as well as providing vetting within the recruitment processes for the FACA/ISF and SMSU.
36. CAR national authorities undertook a review of the national security sector reform strategy, following the challenges CAR security forces faced during the 2020 electoral period. Improving security sector governance was among the priorities identified during the review. MINUSCA and EUTM RCA continue to support and advise the *Inspection Générale des Armées* (IGAN) in strengthening oversight. Consequently, IGAN conducted visits in the entire CAR territory to investigate the performance of the security forces during the electoral violence. The objective was to review the conditions of service, command and control, and other challenges. The UN/MINUSCA continue to monitor integration efforts for former combatants in order to enrol them in training in the army, police and gendarmerie.

37. Besides recommendations defined by the working group for SSR for a new national SSR strategy in June 2021, no further progress has been achieved in this regard. The question of relevance of the current document framework in the domain of SSR/DSR persists and a renewed commitment by CAR authorities to common objectives in this regard is required.
38. The respective objectives for the reestablishment of FACA, defined in the framework of the National Defence Plan (NDP), are still valid and should constitute the common orientation for all international actors engaged in SSR in CAR. However, a recommitment by the CAR government to those official objectives is currently questionable and needs to be demonstrated by acts and not only statements.
39. FACA re-establishment within a Defence Sector Reform, supported by EUTM RCA, is progressing slowly and only partially along the lines of the NDP and has degraded over the last months. In accordance with its mandate, seven battalions of FACA (equivalent to 4.000 personnel) have been trained by EUTM, out of a total of thirteen battalions currently on strength. An unknown but significant number of FACA are currently participating in emergency deployments, out of a total strength of round 9.500, although this figure, due to the lack of a HR management system and proper command and control, might be as large as 12.500. In parallel to the establishment of FACA, but in a completely independent and non-transparent process, the *Groupeement de Sécurité du Président de la République* (GSPR) has been reinforced and currently consists of approximately 2.600 personnel. It is under direct control by the President and does not answer to the FACA General Staff or Parliament.
40. EUTM RCA resumed collective operational training to FACA for the first time since 2018 in providing training to the newly established “*Bataillon d’Infanterie Territoriale 7*” (BIT 7), at the personnel request of President Touadera. However, it is currently controlled by WG personnel who are providing additional training, against the agreement between EUTM and the CAR government on a transparent employment. As of 17 October 2021, elements of unknown (and solely trained by RU) new BIT 9 began to occupy parts of Camp Leclerc in Bouar, accompanied by RU personnel. This further undermines the efforts to establish a common training standard for FACA under full transparency by all relevant actors, including the CAR government.

41. EUAM RCA is providing strategic advice in order to support a sustainable transformation of the ISF into an accountable, coherent, rule-based security provider, under national ownership. This strategic advice to MoI will complement the technical assistance already received under the EU budget support to ISF (EDF funded programme in support to RSS). The CAR ISF are currently composed of around 2.900 police officers, 2.650 gendarmes and around 125 firefighters, with an envisaged strength of 5.000 personnel of Gendarmerie and Police each planned for 2023. The majority of ISF are serving in the capital, but the new Minister for the Interior and Public Security, Nassin, has now ordered all available trained ISF elements to be deployed to the regions of CAR. Performance and behaviour of the ISF in light of the presence of CPC forces is at best questionable. Currently, recruitment for an additional 2.000 ISF personnel is being prepared.
42. The UN have so far incorrectly measured the progress reached within the reestablishment process of FACA, taking into account exclusively the deployed number of troops as a reference. FACA performance has been poor and cases of desertion/defections have been reported when facing imminent CPC attacks. However, a thorough analysis of FACA performance during operations against the CPC was not conducted, as the necessary command and control relations between deployed units and the FACA General Staff are almost non-existing. There is also no established command and control relationship between the FACA General Staff in Bangui and the FACA Regional Headquarters, other than by cell phone with the sous-chef d'opérations in the EMA, who is closely linked with the RU presence in CAR. This lack of control is regularly exploited by RU/WG mercenaries, which then use deployed FACA units for their own purposes, with no control by the nominal FACA chain of command.

***e) Disinformation***

43. Since the COVID-19 pandemic emerged in mid-2020, manipulation on the role and objectives of the “Western” partners of CAR, in particular France and the EU, including directly against the EU Head of Delegation and against EUTM RCA were identified. Orchestrated and coordinated campaigns across various media have taken place, some branding themselves as pro-Russian or enjoying Russian support, with links to pro-government media and the anti-



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West Pan-Africanist movement. Thanks to the effective action of the EUDEL, several press releases were published by the CAR institutions, in particular the Presidency, the MCU (the governing party) and the MLPC (opposition), denouncing these campaigns and reiterating their appreciation for European support. The EEAS has also sensitized its partners (US, UN, AU). However, these campaigns continue, with varying intensity, mainly targeting MINUSCA and France. Consequently, in order to identify hybrid actions and improve resilience of EU actors against them, EUAM RCA should have been equipped with a hybrid threat analysis capacity (Dedicated Analytical Capacity) as per its mandate. Work in order to operationalise a hybrid threat analysis capacity in the Mission is ongoing.

The complexity of the situation in CAR has increased significantly with the establishment of the CPC, new external actors taking action in CAR, such as RW but mostly RU, an increased inability of MINUSCA to fully implement its mandate and an ongoing and intensified struggle for security in the entire territory of CAR, forcing CAR security forces into a type of engagement they have not been prepared for. This further aggravates the dire humanitarian situation and badly affects the already weak economy of CAR. It is crucial to pursue a political solution to the conflict and, in parallel, bring FACA and the ISF back to a process of coordinated, transparent reestablishment under democratic control, while in parallel reducing RU increasing influence on CAR institutions. External international

### **III. OVERVIEW OF SELECTED ENGAGED ACTORS AND THEIR ACTIVITIES**

#### ***a) Regional actors***

44. **African Union (AU):** the AU is one of the guarantors of the Peace Agreement, but AU influence and engagement in CAR are limited, due to a lack of funds and limited qualified personnel in the AU Office in Bangui. Currently the AU is enlarging its presence in Bangui and aims to take a more active role. The African Union Observer Mission in the Central African Republic (MOUACA) should consist of 40 Military Observers, with the task of monitoring the SMSU during their operational employment phase. Even though decided upon in mid-2019 and being financially supported by the EU, the Mission is still not operational and its personnel stays in Bangui. If a more decisive engagement of the AU as the prominent regional organisation in CAR would realize, it could have an important impact, but seems highly unrealistic at this stage.
45. **Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS):** being a guarantor of the 2019 Peace Agreement for CAR, the role of ECCAS remains essential to find a sustainable solution to this crisis. An extraordinary summit of ECCAS was organized a few days before elections in CAR, showing the engagement of the region. However, unilateral initiatives of ECCAS

(negotiations with AG) in the beginning of 2021 created misunderstandings and tensions between the CAR government and ECCAS itself: the proposal of a mediator and regional force of ECCAS failed and was no longer pursued. Whether ECCAS is able to generate a substantial impact on the political and security situation in CAR remains to be seen.

46. **International Conference of the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR):** more actively engaged in CAR since the degradation of the security situation in December 2020, the ICGLR, notably through Angola and Rwanda, has discussed CAR during three summits and initiated the establishment of a “Luanda roadmap” to restore peace and security in CAR. It has therefore not only discussed with the CAR government, but also with Armed Groups and ex-President Bozize. Except the UPC and FPRC, all AG and members of the CPC have accepted the provisions of the roadmap/ ceasefire and have thus committed refrain from further armed action. During these summits, the creation of a regional ICGLR security force to CAR was discussed, with Angola, Rwanda and Congo-Brazzaville being the most likely potential contributors to this endeavour.

***b) UN & MINUSCA***

47. The mandate of MINUSCA was renewed on 12 October 2021 and is valid until 15 November 2022. Under this mandate MINUSCA has the following priority tasks: i) protection of civilians, good offices and support to the peace process ii) facilitation of the immediate, full, safe and unhindered delivery of humanitarian assistance iii) protection of United Nations personnel, installations, equipment and goods. Additional tasks include improving coordination with all humanitarian actors in order to facilitate the creation of a secure environment for the immediate, full, safe and unhindered, civilian-led delivery of humanitarian assistance.
48. The Council further authorized MINUSCA to pursue the promotion and protection of human rights, including monitoring, investigating, reporting annually to the Council and following up on violations of international humanitarian law and human rights abuses committed throughout the Central African Republic.

49. Media statements by the UN SRSG and Head of MINUSCA, Mankeur Ndiaye, that the CAR government should engage in a peaceful dialogue with the CPC, were presented by the media and RU representatives as an interference into CAR national affairs, leading to protests against MINUSCA. In parallel, in May 2021 the UN Mission and Office of the High Commissioner of HR presented the CAR government with a report on Human Rights violations conducted by the CPC as well as by the CAR security forces and their bilateral WG support, creating further fraction between the CAR government and MINUSCA. According to the report, 46% of the violations and abuses documented are attributed to national forces (FACA/ISF) and other bilaterally deployed security personnel. Although the authenticity of the cases was questioned by CAR authorities, President Touadera decided to create a special commission of inquiry on the reported atrocities. In the wake of those violations, on 12 June 2021, RW decided to cease all bilateral support and refrain from joint operations with FACA and RU/WG.
50. The UN Mission is in a delicate phase, being criticized by parts of the government and political class for its statements and inability to properly implement its mandate, and being subject to a constant disinformation campaign, presumably orchestrated by RU. RU presence represents a growing challenge for MINUSCA regarding the mandated task to protect civilians and support the peace process (to note that RU was the only member of the UNSC to abstain when the UN requested to increase the ceiling of authorized military and police personnel in MINUSCA), further aggravated by a growing number of Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) violations by RU and central African security forces. As an example, on 01 October 2021, 24 MINUSCA soldiers were taken into custody for several hours by CAR Gendarmerie, their arms taken away and only returned several days later. One EUAM RCA Mission Member accompanying the MINUSCA troops suffered the same fate, although he presented his official ID documents. This is the first time that the SOMA/SOFA of EUAM/EUTM had been disrespected by CAR entities.
51. Since the CPC offensive started, MINUSCA has been trying to repulse their attacks and to regain control of the cities and villages that came under CPC control. However, the Missions' capacities are insufficient to establish a decisive deterrent presence in all hotspots of CAR.

Therefore, its actions are mainly of reactive character. MINUSCA does not coordinate or cooperate with RU bilateral support to FACA.

52. With a view to better respond to CPC actions, MINUSCA had been reinforced by 300 personnel from South Sudan (UNMISS) and an additional 2.700 peacekeepers are to be deployed until early 2022, bringing its force strength to around 14.500. While receiving the first reinforcements from Rwanda, Senegal and Tunisia, the UN had to retract the entire Gabonese contingent to MINUSCA from the Mission due to accusations of sexual abuse against the CAR population. It will therefore be essential for the UN to generate MS' contingents for the Mission that provide additional capabilities (Air-ground surveillance, Close Air Support, intra-theatre airlift, Rapid-reaction forces etc.) and are operationally effective, which is currently mainly observed by the PT QRF to MINUSCA. MINUSCA is also deployed along the lines of communication (LOC) to Bangui in order to safeguard the vital flow of goods to the capital.
53. Since the 2013 crisis in the country, the UN Security Council has imposed a sanctions regime against CAR. On 29 July 2021, the UNSC has unanimously adopted resolution 2588 (2021), which renews the sanctions regime until 31 July 2022, including the arms embargo. Items exempt from the arms embargo comprise supplies to the CAR security forces of weapons with a calibre of 14.5mm or less, ammunition and components for such weapons. Newly added to this list in June 2021 were mortars up to a calibre of 82mm.

***c) Russian Federation:***

54. Russia continues to play an ambiguous and non-transparent role. RU appears to conduct a complex hybrid strategy in CAR, conducting disinformation campaigns, engaging in economic activities (mining resources, cooperation in customs and natural resources exploitations), acting as a security provider through Wagner and strengthening its influence, e.g. with the deployment of a small RU military advisory Mission to the CAR MoD. Benefiting from the opportunity to fill the security gap during last years' events, RU/WG presence and action in CAR has constantly increased. Deployed in-country officially since

2018, they have gradually intensified their presence in almost all domains of the government. The question of financial debt of CAR towards RU/WG will be of importance, as well as the severe Human Rights violations by RU mercenaries during their operations and their respective judicial follow-up.

55. Russia was fully committed to support the re-election of President Touadera by providing IT-support, and security reinforcements in anticipation of possible disturbances. Since the degradation of the security situation, RU has unofficially reinforced its assets in CAR with several hundred Wagner mercenaries. Those are employed in direct action against the CPC since 20 December 2020. Recent deliveries of armoured vehicles and small arms donated to FACA, although outdated, and the deployment of Russian military personnel, have been the subject of extensive communications operations.
56. RU provided a third delivery of weapons to CAR (assault rifles and ammunition) in May 2021, indicated that 92 FACA personnel would be trained in Russia, and that additional 600 RU “instructors” would be deployed to CAR (200 each for FACA, Gendarmerie and Police), bringing the total quantity of RU military personnel in CAR to approx. 2.600 to officially support the Security Sector Reform. Actual figures could, however, be higher.
57. RU, supported by the CAR government, has attempted to exercise more influence and to gain legitimacy through the *Comité de Coordination Technique* (CCT), which is the main coordination body between the different heads of mission in the domain of SSR in CAR. The presence of the local WG representative Vitali Perfilev in this committee however was recently opposed by other international representatives.
58. In parallel to its training to FACA, WG also started to train the ISF in its training location in Berengo, under unknown standards. This can be seen as an attempt to increase the number of deployable CAR security forces under RU influence, as the limited presence of FACA has proven insufficient to assume control over all vital parts of the country. Therefore, it is assessed that, once trained, these ISF will be likely deployed under RU coordination, and command and control, further intensifying the RU grip on CAR security forces.

59. The current deployment pattern of WG assets, with no more clear main lines of effort, is covering all vital parts in the west and centre of CAR, with a priority to economically important mining areas in order to secure WG investments through Lobaye Investment Company, . Furthermore, RU elements have also started to incur the vast natural reserves/ environmental protection areas in the east of CAR like Chinko, which are also supported by the EU, and use them for yet unknown purposes.
60. Even though RU/WG has recently stepped up its engagement to CAR, it seems to have reached a culmination point where it will have to rely more on support by FACA/ISF, as its presence in CAR might not be sustainable in the medium term. While having had a positive effect on security in CAR during its early days of deployment against the CPC in December 2020/January 2021, being the short-term survival guarantee of the CAR government, it immediately started to generate negative side effects. Those include the harassment of parts of the population, mostly the Muslim/Fulani communities, arbitrary killings, rapes and torture, even of collocated FACA, as well as the collection of illegal taxes and confiscation of goods. In the medium term, therefore, a continued presence of WG mercenaries might deepen the breaches within the CAR population and with FACA units deployed on the ground and lead to further instability, as RU/WG will likely not be able to neutralize the CPC even with FACA support.
61. In order to bring FACA back to the intended re-establishment process as a garrison army, including an operational cycle, the precondition would be a Relieve in Place (RIP) by other legitimate security actors and to end their dependency on RU/Wagner operations.

***d) France***

62. France is the only EU Member State with a permanent diplomatic representation. Over the years, France has provided support to the CAR security forces in the form of training, education and equipment donations. It also has a bilateral military mission in CAR, providing advice to the security forces. While France has decided to cut back its bilateral support to CAR in terms of military support and budgetary/programme support as a reaction to the evolution of the political situation and the role played by RU in that regard, this did not affect FR multilateral engagement, including at EU level.

***e) United States (US)***

63. The United States has been one of CAR's main partners during recent years, initially motivated by the deployment of US Special Forces in the east of the country combatting the Lord's Resistance Army AG (LRA). There is a revitalized longer-term aspiration in support of peace-building in the region which is also aiming to reduce Russian influence in the region. US support to Defence Sector Reform in CAR includes vehicle donations, non-lethal individual equipment, communications systems, support to military justice and stipends. As a reaction on RU/WG use of US-donated vehicles to FACA, the US suspended its training and logistic support to FACA in April 2021, but continues to support the CAR ISF for the time being. The US is supporting a more prominent and constructive role for regional actors in CAR, the deployment of a regional force included, also with the aim to reduce CAR dependency on RU/WG. The US has already sanctioned several members of WG and is exploring options to offer CAR the incentives necessary to rein RU influence.

***f) Political – strategic overview of EU CSDP engagement, objectives and positioning of the EU***

64. EU objectives in CAR have remain unchanged and will only be reached if a secure environment is created through the disarmament of CPC/AG and the orderly deployment of FACA, ISF and public services throughout the country. FACA and ISF should be operating under democratic control and integrating Human Rights, including International Humanitarian Law and gender perspective in their training programmes, as part of the overall planning process, as well as during deployments and the conduct of operations, in line with a robust legal framework and related doctrine.



IV.

The pre-eminent RU influence on the CAR government entails growing concerns from the International Community. It will have to be assessed if the CAR government will maintain this dependence or if its political and economic consequences would counterbalance it. The increased engagement of regional actors should provide an opportunity for a political solution to the conflict in CAR and could facilitate a return to a sustainable development of the country. If this engagement materializes into concrete actions, it could be an alternative for the CAR government to end the current reliance on RU support and WG security personnel. In parallel, and after a commitment by the new CAR government to common objectives, the provision of a safe environment by the UN could provide the necessary security umbrella that would enable the planned and coordinated reestablishment of CAR security forces under democratic control, and parallel WG withdrawal, as a precondition for

**CSDP MISSIONS POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT**

65. Both EU CSDP Missions are delivering their mandate in a hybrid environment which has become more complex since last year. Moreover, the partnership established with CAR authorities when each of the Missions was launched could be put into further question if the current situation is not improving within the coming months. The local appropriation and the capacity built after six years of military CSDP presence has not concretely materialised within the defence sector, while EUAM is just starting to deliver its full mandate, whose effects will be assessed in the framework of the next Strategic Review.
66. The intended re-establishment of FACA/ISF and the support provided to the MoD/MoI PS needs a condition-based foundation: only when the necessary commitment in terms of full transparency or provision of training audiences by CAR authorities, often lacking during recent months, are being met, EUTM/EUAM will be able to fully engage in the foreseen support to CAR security forces. This includes the willingness of the new CAR Government to keep up its support to EU CSDP efforts and the strategic advice that is being provided by the Missions.
67. Since its deployment, **EUAM RCA** has conducted a state of play and situational analysis of the ISF and supported the process of finalizing the draft LPFSI before its adoption in

parliament, initially foreseen for spring 2021. The LPFSI should be the foundation on which all EUAM actions will be based. Its lack currently slows down several processes within the ISF and leaves the Mission's strategic advisors with an incomplete legal framework and therefore clear objectives to be achieved. Close coordination between the different actors supporting the ISF in CAR is key to the provision of an integrated support generating maximum efficiency. Regular coordination is pursued with all international organisations that support EU efforts, such as CIVIPOL and *Fondation Suisse de Déminage* (FSD). The coordination with EUTM RCA also covers the domain of Interoperability between ISF and FACA. Identically, close coordination is pursued with FR, as well as with the US. However, the lacking transparency and willingness to coordinate efforts by some other actors, such as RU, have prevented a more comprehensive and effective international coordination, creating frictions between different approaches to a common endeavour.

68. **EUTM RCA, the EU military CSDP Training Mission**, is mandated to support the reform of the *Forces Armées Centrafricaines* (FACA) as a prerequisite for stability in CAR, unchanged for the current mandate until September 2022.
69. EUTM RCA is mandated to; (i) Provide strategic advice to CAR's Ministry of Defence (MoD), Military Staff (EMA) and *Forces Armées Centrafricaines* (FACA), (ii) Education to the FACA commissioned and non-commissioned officers, (iii) Training to the FACA. In achieving the desired end-state, FACA should be able of autonomously - or with minimum external support - conducting its defence role in addressing the persisting security challenges. The conditions that would permit a sustainable exit strategy for EUTM RCA will not be in-place at the end of EUTM's current mandate (September 2022).
70. Two of EUTM's main tasks have already been achieved; while it still has to provide strategic advice in order to enable the MoD/FACA and facilitate their evolution into a credible security provider under democratic control, the Missions' tasks in terms of training (6 FACA battalions) and education (50% of officers and NCO's) have already been met.
71. The **Strategic Advisory Pillar of EUTM RCA (SAP)** will provide enhanced advice in its enlarged Mission Area in the form of non-executive accompaniment to FACA regional headquarter (*Etat-Major de Zone de Défense* (EMZD)) garrisons of N'dele and Bangassou in

a condition-based approach, dependent on the evolution of the security situation. However, this also depends on the FACA ability and willingness to deploy and maintain troops in the respective garrisons. With a high level of divergence from foreseen structures and deployments to the actual situation of FACA on the ground, and without an established command and control relationship between Bangui and the different garrisons, this will have to be steered into the right direction again, with the support of the SAP of EUTM. Only after the garrisons of Bouar, N'dele and Bangassou with their EMZD will be operational, a targeted advice can start.

72. It will be important for EUTM to implement the capacity to conduct a proper follow-up of EUTM trained FACA units during their garrison and operational deployments, which is crucial for the elaboration of future recurrent and operational training provided to FACA. Due to the dire security situation in recent months, however, this was not possible. This becomes particularly important in light of allegations of misconduct, including HR and IHL violations by FACA during operational deployments, making the respective quality control in terms of HR and IHL standards an urgent necessity for EUTM. Proposals made in the last Strategic Review regarding the assessment of FACA performance during their deployments and the analysis of their operational planning lead to an enlargement of the Mission Area to reflect the progressing evolution of FACA.
73. The **Education Pillar (EDP)** of EUTM RCA has so far provided training to the majority of FACA non-commissioned officers and officers, while some FACA personnel have received recurrent education already. Therefore, the task of the Mission in relation to education has been achieved in terms of quantity. Currently, the Mission is concentrating on the provision of support to the FACA NCO School in Bouar and Officer School in Bangui as the future main FACA education installations.
74. The task to train four to six FACA battalions by the **Operational Training Pillar (OTP)** of EUTM was achieved when EUTM finished the provision of training to BIT 1, BIT 2, BIT 3, BIT 4, the Amphibious Battalion, the BIT 7 and the Special Forces Battalion. These BIT were intended to be deployed to the pre-defined garrisons as laid out in the NDP, but have been fractured due to a high number of emergency deployments in an uncoordinated and

unsustainable manner. Today, their effectiveness are scattered in small contingent deployments over the entire CAR territory and they can't be regarded as integral units anymore. Due to the fact that FACA are currently not available to receive operational training by EUTM RCA, besides some specialist training, the OTP isn't fully utilized.

75. FACA's persistent lack of equipment and logistic support for trainings negatively affects the efficiency of the training. This will have to be addressed while preparing for upcoming recurrent training of FACA battalions, as well as for the revitalisation of the FACA NCO School in Bouar and the Officer School in Bangui. Their revitalization could benefit from possible EPF assistance measures beginning in 2022.
76. FACA have successfully proven that they are able to plan, administrate and conduct training programmes by themselves (e.g. FETTA), with advisory support and supervision provided by EUTM. However, while the objective of EUTM is a sustainable long-term structural development of the defence sector, CAR national priorities are focusing on short term effects, due to the current security situation and a priority for short-term kinetic support by RU assets. Therefore, the establishment of an operational cycle with focus on operational recurrent training to FACA battalions is not the first priority of the FACA General Staff at this stage. Without the willingness and necessary commitment to establish this cycle for FACA and a proper prioritization by the FACA General Staff, it will be difficult if not unlikely that the FACA can be re-established as a functional garrison army. In addition, the garrison army model for FACA seems to be favoured by the political and FACA leadership, but not the troops forming the proposed garrisons, as living conditions there are much less favourable compared to Bangui.
77. For EUTM future efforts, the political orientation leading to a decision on how FACA are to be employed will be a decisive point: current utilisation of FACA is preventing the planned reestablishment of sustainable and operational security forces along the garrison army model. One decisive element will be the availability of FACA units for operational and recurrent training by EUTM, without interference by third actors. This will enable and lead to the EUTM fostered realisation of an operational cycle for FACA, an essential element towards

the creation of a sustainable and operational garrison army. A clear positioning and according action of the CAR government in this regard will be essential.

78. **Within this context**, the CAR government will need support by regional actors to help them overcome their reliance on WG support to their security operations. An ECCAS/ICGLR initiative could be a vector to overcome this dependence on WG support. Besides relieving deployed FACA from their commitment to conduct security operations beyond their current capabilities, this would make FACA available for recurrent operational training by EUTM RCA again and, in the medium-term, generate the forces foreseen in the National Defence Plan. Preconditions for this effort will be the full commitment of the CAR government to this process and the cease of RU security activities in CAR, without foiling the training that is provided by EUTM RCA. This includes that neither EU financed structures/equipment will be utilized by RU/WG and to refrain from providing add-on training to questionable standards after FACA units have already been certified by EUTM.
79. It will also be necessary to develop support measures that provide immediate support and relief to the CAR security forces. EUTM and EUAM are designed to support long-term reestablishment and reform processes and structural objectives in a permissive environment. While being restricted to a non-executive mandate, both CSDP Missions cannot provide direct support to FACA in their struggle against the CPC. EUAM/EUTM RCA and other EU entities on the operational level should provide a focused analysis on the drivers for failure in conducting operations and suggest measures to improve CAR government and security forces' resilience and their overall governance. Additional measures providing short term effects should address all weaknesses identified during the analysis.

Both EU CSDP Missions are delivering their mandate in a hybrid environment which has become more complex since last year. Moreover, the partnership established with CAR authorities when each of the Missions was launched could be put into further question if the current situation is not improving within the coming months. The intended reestablishment of FACA/ISF and the support provided to the MoD/MoI needs a condition-based foundation and full transparency. This includes the willingness of the CAR Government to keep up its support to EU CSDP efforts and the strategic advice that is being provided by the Missions.

Two of EUTM's main tasks have already been achieved, but it will not have reached its desired end-state during its current mandate. To cover both the medium/long-term structural needs of FACA and the ISF, as well as the imminent short-term security needs generated by the conflict with CPC, the CAR government will require support by regional actors that will help them to overcome their dominant reliance on WG support to their security operations. Preconditions for this effort will be the full commitment of the CAR Government to this process and the cessation of RU security activities in CAR, without interfering in the training that is provided by EUTM RCA.

**V) VECTORS FOR FURTHER ANALYSIS FOR EU CSDP ENGAGEMENT IN CAR**

80. The establishment of a strong RU presence in CAR, with increased influence on decision makers in Bangui, has put international actors like MINUSCA, but also the EU CSDP Missions, in a more difficult environment. It will now be necessary to support the CAR government in finding options to weaken this influence, propose viable alternatives and to monitor if this will lead into concrete actions. The future positioning of the CAR government related to WG/FACA operations, their HR and IHL violations, a common defined objective in form of the NDP, RU influence on the ISF will need to be monitored and analysed. This will determine the future EU CSDP footprint in CAR, which will be addressed in the upcoming holistic Strategic Review of EUTM and EUAM RCA.

**81. *In the political domain:***

- The CAR government is internally fragmented and does not represent a consented political will. It will therefore be necessary to monitor and further analyse the approach and actual steps that CAR political actors will undertake, with a specific focus on their links with RU/WG.
- The expressed commitment to common objectives between the CAR government and the EU should result in concrete positive actions, such as a cessation of military action by WG/FACA in compliance with the ceasefire and the Luanda roadmap. Progress on the next steps of this roadmap should be monitored and supported/accompanied, if possible.

- The question of the dependency of the CAR authorities on RU/WG needs to be answered as RU/WG have increased their influence in many national decision making processes, thereby obstructing certain efforts of the EU.

**82. *In the inter-institutional domain:***

- The reinforcement of MINUSCA and its ability to fulfil its mandate will be a decisive factor, as well as the full respect of the SOFA of MINUSCA by all actors. The future role of MINUSCA in presence of new actors in CAR needs to be observed.
- A revitalized engagement by the region / neighbouring countries and its regional organisations could increase their influence on CAR decision makers, especially if a credible regional military security force would materialise and be deployed. These are potentially major determinants for future EU CSDP engagement, as well as for possible EU support to a regional military force.

**83. *In the SSR domain:***

- The commitment of the CAR authorities, including the MoD, General Staff and the MoI to the agreed partnership when each of the CSDP Missions was launched needs to be confirmed by action on the ground, and not only statements and oral commitments.
- The CAR authorities' willingness to firmly develop Defence and Security Sector reforms supported by CSDP should be confirmed, including at senior operational level, as well as their commitment to their National Defence Plan to establish a garrison army that would enable the presence of the State in the entire territory of CAR.
- The respect for international standards with regard to Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law by FACA/ISF during their operations needs to be further monitored and assessed, as well as the judicial follow up of violations already reported to the CAR government by MINUSCA.
- The fact that RU/WG takes over command and control on deployed FACA/ISF has to be monitored. This includes RU presence in the ISF training establishments and associated infrastructure.

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- The engagement of RU actors in CAR executive coordination committees, like the Comité de Coordination technique (CCT), as an attempt to institutionalize RU engagement in CAR, should be addressed.
- Given the current circumstances, any future provision of EUTM training to FACA should be condition-based, with the definition of necessary caveats for its conduct, including the respect of HR and IHL.
- Options for bringing FACA back to a coordinated reestablishment process that includes recurrent operational training to BIT and the implementation of an operational cycle should be readdressed.
- The possibility of a strategic communication campaign by the EU, directed against WG influence and actions, not restricted to CAR, as well as HR violations FACA internally and against the CAR population, should be considered.



3R	Retour, Réclamation et Réhabilitation
AG	Armed Group
AI	African Initiative for Peace and Reconciliation in CAR
ANE	Autorité National des Elections
AU	African Union
APF	African Peace Facility
APPR	Accord Politique pour la Paix et la Réconciliation
BIT	Bataillon d’Infanterie Territoriale
CAR	Central African Republic
CBSD	Capacity Building for Security and Development
CCT	Comité de Coordination Technique
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CMC	Crisis Management Concept
CPC	Coalition des Patriotes pour le Changement
CPCC	Civil Planning and Conduct Capability
CPS	Court Pénale Spéciale
CVJRR	Commission Vérité, Justice, Réparation, Réconciliation
DDRR	Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegration, Repatriation
DGGN	Direction Générale de la Gendarmerie Nationale
DGO	Direction Générale des Operations
DGPC	Direction Générale de la Police Centrafricaine
DSR	Defence Sector Reform

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ECCAS	Economic Community of the Central African States
EDF	European Development Fund
EMA	Etat-major des Armées
EMZD	Etat-Major de Zone de Défense
EDP	Education Pillar
ERM	Early Response Mechanism
EUAM RCA	EU Advisory Mission in the Central African Republic
EUDEL	EU Delegation
EUTM RCA	EU Training Mission in the Central African Republic
FACA	Forces Armées Centrafricaines
FETTA	Formation élémentaire toutes armes
FPI	Foreign Policy Instrument
FPRC	Front Populaire pour la Renaissance de la Centrafrique
FSD	Fondation Suisse de Deminage
GSPR	Groupement de Sécurité de la Président de la République
HNO	Humanitarian Needs Overview
HoM	Head of Mission
HR	Human Rights
ICGLR	International Conference of the Great Lakes Region
IcSP	Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IGAN	Inspection Générale des Armées
IHL	International Humanitarian Law
IOC	Initial Operating Capability

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### *Limited*

IOM	International Organisation for Migration
ISF	Internal Security Forces
JSCC	Joint Support and Coordination Cell
LOC	Line of Communication
LPFSI	Loi de programmation pour les forces de la sécurité intérieure
LRRD	Linking, Relief, Rehabilitation and Development
MAC	Mission Analytical Capacity
MCU	Mouvement Cœurs Unis
MINUSCA	United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the CAR
MLPC	Mouvement pour la Libération des Peuples Centrafricaines
MoD	Ministry of Defence
MoI PS	Ministry for the Interior and Public Security
MoJ	Ministry for Justice
MPCC	Military Planning and Conduct Capability
MPC	Mouvement Patriotique pour la Centrafrique
NDP	National Defence Plan
NIP	National Indicative Programme
OTP	Operational Training Pillar
PGRR – FSI	Plan Global de Redimensionnement et de Redéploiement des FSI
PSC	Political and Security Committee
QRF	Quick Reaction Force
RCPCA	Plan National de Relèvement et de Consolidation de la Paix 2017-2021
RU	Russian Federation
RW	Rwanda

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SAP	Strategic Advisory Pillar
SMSU	Special Mixed Security Unit
SOFA/SOMA	Status of Forces Agreement / Status of Mission Agreement
SR	Strategic Review
SSR	Security Sector Reform
TEU	Treaty of the European Union
UN	United Nations
UNMISS	United Nations Mission in South Sudan
UNPOL	United Nations Police
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
UPC	Union pour la Paix en Centrafrique
WG	Wagner Group private military company